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COMMENTS
Solidary Liability in Louisiana Tort Law, Article 2324:
Amendments and Ambiguities
I. INTRODUCTION
The Louisiana Legislature amended Louisiana Civil Code article 2324' in
1987,2 transforming solidary liability in Louisiana tort law from a simple to a
complex and confusing process. Before 1987, a plaintiff could recover the whole
judgment from any solidarily liable defendant unless plaintiff's fault, if any, was
greater than defendant's fault under Article 2324. The underlying policy behind
solidary liability is to assure the plaintiff a complete recovery.' In order to
achieve this, the risk of insolvency of a tortfeasor was transferred from the
plaintiff to the other solidarily liable tortfeasors. The 1987 amendments
jeopardize the security provided to the plaintiff under Article 2324.
The 1987 amendments to Article 2324 were the result of efforts of tort
reformers. Before 1987, some courts believed Article 2324 was unfair to
tortfeasors.4 The main concern was for the solidarily liable tortfeasor only
slightly at fault. Under pre-amendment Article 2324, even a solidarily liable
tortfeasor only one percent at fault could be required to pay one hundred percent
of the judgment if the plaintiff was not at fault. The tortfeasor's right to
Copyright 1994, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. Art. 2324. Liability as solidary or joint and divisible obligation
A. He who conspires with another person to commit an intentional or willful act is
answerable, in solido, with that person, for the damage caused by such act.
B. If liability is not solidary pursuant to Paragraph A, or as otherwise provided by law,
then liability for damages caused by two or more persons shall be solidary only to the
extent necessary for the person suffering injury, death, or loss to recover fifty percent of
his recoverable damages; however, when the amount of recovery has been reduced in
accordance with the preceding Article, a judgment debtor shall not be liable for more than
the degree of his fault to a judgment creditor to whom a greater degree of fault has been
attributed. Under the provisions of this Article, all parties shall enjoy their respective
rights of indemnity and contribution. Except as described in Paragraph A of this Article,
or as otherwise provided by law, and hereinabove, the liability for damages caused by two
or more persons shall be a joint, divisible obligation, and a joint tortfeasor shall not be
solidarily liable with any other person for damages attributable to the fault of such other
person, including the person suffering injury, death, or loss, regardless of such other
person's insolvency, ability to pay, degree of fault, or immunity by statute or otherwise.
La. Civ. Code art. 2324.
2. 1987 La. Acts No. 373 (effective September 1, 1987).
3. Thomas C. Galligan, 2324: The Creature from the Tort Refonn Lagoon, 25 The Trial Brief,
No. 2 p. 1 (1992); M. Kevin Queenan, Comment, Civil Code Article 2324: A Broken Path to Limited
Solidary Liability, 49 La. L. Rev. 1351, 1356 (1989).
4. Weber v. Caterpillar Mach. Corp., 542 So. 2d 544, 554 (La. App. 5th Cir.), writs denied,
548 So. 2d 332, 334 (1989); Morrison v. J.A. Jones Constr. Co., 537 So. 2d 360, 365 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1988); Thompson v. Petrounited Terminals, Inc., 536 So. 2d 504, 516 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1988),
writs denied, 537 So. 3d 212, 213 (1989).
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contribution5 from other tortfeasors provides little assistance if the other
tortfeasors are insolvent. Amended Article 2324(B) places a cap on the amount
a solidarily liable tortfeasor may be required to pay, which should lessen this
unfair result. 6 The legislature, however, did not stop at capping the amount the
iortfeasor may be required to pay; it made other changes which caused ambiguity
in the statute.
Phrases such as "recoverable damages," "as otherwise provided by law," and
"to the extent necessary" were used in the statute but left undefined. The
phrases are not defined elsewhere in the Civil Code, and because none of these
phrases appeared in the pre-amendment statute, there are no jurisprudential
interpretations. This absence of guidance has caused reactions from scholars,
with one referring to the statute as a "monster. 7 Even the Louisiana Supreme
Court has acknowledged that the statute is "not clear and free of ambiguity."8
Nonetheless, the judiciary and scholars will be left with the task of interpreting
amended Article 2324.
The 1987 amendments divided Article 2324 into two sections, Article
2324(A) and (B). 9 In 1988, Article 2324 was amended again to add section
(C).10 The purpose of this comment is to interpret the most confusing section
of amended Article 2324, section (B). This comment does not explore the
effects of contribution" and indemnity 2 in detail. However, contribution and
indemnity will affect a tortfeasor's ability to recover amounts paid in excess of
his virile share. Before discussing the 1987 amendment to Article 2324(B), a
brief discussion of solidary liability is helpful.
5. Article 1804 states in pan: "'A solidary obligor who has rendered the whole performance,
though subrogated to the right of the obligee, may claim from the other obligors no more than the
virile portion of each." La. Civ. Code art. 1804.
6. Article 2324(B) states in part: "[Lliability for damages caused by two or more persons shall
be solidary only to the extent necessary for the person suffering injury ... to recover fifty percent
of his recoverable damages .... La. Civ. Code art. 2324.
7. Galligan, supra note 3, at I.
8. Touchard v. Williams, 617 So. 2d 885, 888 (La. 1993).
9. Article 2324(A) applies to those who "conspire with another person to commit an intentional
or willful act." Under the amended statute, as well as the old statute, these solidarily liable
tortfeasors are answerable for the damages caused by their act, or the whole judgment. The
amendment does not appear to have changed solidary liability for intentional tortfeasors and is not
discussed here.
10. This section provides only that interruption of prescription for one solidarily liable tortfeasor
interrupts prescription for all solidarily liable tortfeasors. The tortfeasor must be found solidarily
liable to interrupt prescription for all other solidarily liable tortfeasors. See Spoti v. Otis Elevator
Co., 601 So. 2d 1355 (La. 1992). This section has not caused much confusion and is not discussed
here.
11. If a solidarily liable tortfeasor is required to pay more than his virile share, he may seek
contribution from other solidarily liable tortfeasors who have not paid their virile share, but for no
more than that share. See supra note 5.
12. A solidarily liable tortfeasor not at fault may seek indemnity from the solidarily liable
tortfeasor at fault. See La. Civ. Code art. 1804.
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Solidary liability in Louisiana is similar to joint and several liability at
common law. Solidary liability applies when a plaintiff's injuries are indivisi-
ble.' 3 If plaintiffs injuries are divisible, defendants are not solidarily liable and
are only liable for their virile share.' 4  Article 2324 applies only when a
plaintiffs injuries are not divisible and fault cannot be apportioned among
defendants. A look at how Article 2324 was applied before 1987 will illustrate
the problems with the amended statute.
II. PRE-AMENDMENT ARTICLE 2324
Under pre-amendment Article 2324, a plaintiff could, in some circumstances,
recover the whole judgment from any solidarily liable tortfeasor even though that
tortfeasor was only one percent at fault. If a portion of the fault was attributed
to the plaintiff, comparative fault under Article 2323's applied such that
plaintiff's judgment would be reduced according to his portion of fault. A
tortfeasor whose percentage of fault was less than that of the plaintiff was liable
only for his virile share.16  Thus, the plaintiff could not seek the whole
judgment from that tortfeasor. Furthermore, prior to the amendments, the
plaintiff's recovery could not be reduced by the fault of a statutorily immune
tortfeasor, such as an employer.' 7 The fault of this tortfeasor was not quanti-
fied. The following hypothetical will illustrate how the pre-amendment statute
was applied.
In 1984, an accident involving a forklift occurred at a construction site.
George, owner of Katz Construction, was persuaded to drive a forklift by Elaine,
a friend not employed by Katz. Elaine knew George was not qualified to drive
the forklift, but thought it would be fun to see George act like a real construction
worker. George also knew of his inability to drive the forklift and the dangers
it would cause. Kramer, an employee of Katz Construction, was listening to his
radio when the forklift George was driving ran over him. Kramer's leg was
13. Article 1789 provides in part: "When a joint obligation is indivisible, joint obligors or
obligees are subject to the rules governing solidary obligors or solidary obligees." La. Civ. Code art.
1789.
14. Article 1789 states in part: "When a joint obligation is divisible, each joint obligor is bound
to perform, and each joint obligee is entitled to receive, only his portion." La. Civ. Code art. 1789.
15. Article 2323 states: "When contributory negligence is applicable to a claim for damages
... the amount of damages recoverable shall be reduced in proportion to the degree or percentage
of negligence attributable to the person ...." La. Civ. Code art. 2323.
16. Article 2324 previously stated that "when the amount of recovery has been reduced in
accordance with the preceding article [Article 2323], a judgment debtor shall not be liable for more
than the degree of his fault to a judgment creditor to whom a greater degree of negligence has been
attributed." This exception has been retained in amended Article 2324(B).
17. Eskine v. Regional Transit Auth., 531 So. 2d 1159 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1988); Senez v.
Grumman Flxible Corp., 518 So. 2d 574 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1987), writ denied, 521 So. 2d 1151
(1988); Franklin v. Oilfield Heavy Haulers, 478 So. 2d 549 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1985), writs denied,
481 So. 2d 1330, 1331 (1986).
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crushed. The finder of fact determines that Kramer might have heard the forklift
if he had not been listening to his radio and that the forklift had defective brakes.
All the parties are solidarily liable since the injury is not divisible. The finder
of fact allocates fault in the following manner:
Party Percentage of Fault
Kramer (Plaintiff) 15%
George (Employer) 60%
Elaine (George's friend) 5%
Jerrylift (Manufacturer 20%
of forklift)
Since this accident occurred before 1987, pre-amendment Article 2324 will
apply.' 8  Under the pre-amendment article, it was improper to quantify
employer fault. However, at times, such as when the employer intervened for
reimbursement of worker's compensation payments, juries would quantify the
fault of the employer.'9 When the improper quantification occurred, courts
applied one of three methods to remedy the situation. If the plaintiff were more
at fault than the third-party tortfeasor, the court might allocate all of the
quantified employer fault to the plaintiff; conversely, if the third-party tortfeasor
were more at fault than the plaintiff, the court might allocate all the quantified
employer fault to the third-party tortfeasor. 20 However, the Louisiana Supreme
Court adopted a different approach that distributed the employer's fault to all
parties at fault, including the plaintiff, in proportion to their fault." This
approach is the most recent pre-amendment method and will be used to
redistribute the employer fault in the hypothetical. Thus, the fault would be
reapportioned in the following manner:
18. The 1987 amendment to Article 2324 was a change in the substantive law and applies
prospectively. Miley v. Louisiana Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co., 599 So. 2d 791, 806 (La. App.
1st Cir.), writ denied, 604 So. 2d 1313 (1992); Perez v. State, 578 So. 2d 1199, 1205-6 (La. App.
4th Cir.), writ denied, 581 So. 2d 706 (1991); Morris5n v. J.A. Jones Const. Co., 537 So. 2d 360,
365 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1988).
19. Weber v. Caterpillar Mach. Corp., 542 So. 2d 544 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writs denied, 548 So.
2d 332, 334 (1989); Thompson v. Petrounited Terminals, Inc., 536 So. 2d 504 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1988), writs denied, 537 So. 2d 212, 213 (1989); Morrison v. J.A. Jones Constr. Co., 537 So. 2d 360
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1988); Senez v. Grumman Flxible Corp., 518 So. 2d 574 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1987),
writ denied, 521 So. 2d 1151 (1988); Franklin v. Oilfield Heavy Haulers, 478 So. 2d 549 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1985), writs denied, 481 So. 2d 1330, 1331 (1986).
20. David W. Robertson, The Louisiana Lav of Comparative Fault: A Decade of Progress, 1
La. Practice Series 55 (1991).
21. Guidry v. Frank Guidry Oil Co., 579 So. 2d 947, 954 (La. 1991), overruled by Gauthier v.
O'Brien 618 So. 2d 825 (La. 1993).
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Party Percentage of fault
Kramer (Plaintiff) 37.5% (15/40)
Elaine (George's friend) 12.5% (5/40)
Jerrylift (Manufacturer 50 % (20/40)
of forklift)
Under the pre-amendment article, Kramer is able to recover sixty-two and
one-half percent of the judgment from Jerrylift, the manufacturer of the forklift.
Kramer is not able to recover one hundred percent of the judgment because,
under Article 2323, his comparative fault reduces the amount he can recover.22
Also, Kramer could not require Elaine to pay sixty-two and one-half percent of
the judgment since her fault is less than his.23 Thus, Kramer is only able to
collect, at most, twelve and one-half percent of the judgment from Elaine. Under
the principles of contribution, if Jerrylift is required to pay sixty-two and one-
half percent of the judgment, it is entitled to twelve and one-half percent of the
judgment as contribution from Elaine. 24
This was a simple method of applying solidary liability. Amended Article
2324(B) poses problems not present under the pre-amendment article. First, does
solidary liability apply if plaintiff can recover at least fifty percent of his recover-
able damages? Second, what does the exception "for cases as otherwise
provided by law" mean? Third, is employer fault quantified, and if so, what do
you do with the quantified fault? Fourth, is phantom tortfeasor25 fault quanti-
fied, and what do you do with the quantified fault? Finally, what are "recover-
able damages"?
III. WHEN DOES ARTICLE 2324 APPLY AFTER THE 1987 AMENDMENT?
A. When is it "necessary" to apply Article 2324(B)?
After 1987, some scholars and commentators questioned the applicability of
amended Article 2324(B) when plaintiff could recover more than fifty percent
of his judgment. 26 The confusion arose from the language of Article 2324(B)
providing that "liability for damages caused by two or more persons shall be
22. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
23. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
24. See supra note 5.
25. Phantom tortfeasors are those third-party torfeasors not made parties to the suit. Usually,
they are drivers of vehicles that contribute to automobile accidents but leave the scene. See
Devereaux v. Allstate Ins. Co., 557 So. 2d 1091 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1990); Vamado v. Continental Ins.
Co., 446 So: 2d 1343 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1984).
26. Galligan, supra note 3, at 2-3; Karl J. Koch, Contemporary Tort Issues, Solidarity,
Contribution and Comparative Fault 6-7 (September 25-26, 1992)(Unpublished material from the
Center of Continuing Professional Development, Paul M. Hebert Law Center).
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solidary only to the extent necessary for the person ... to recover fifty percent
of his recoverable damages."" If a plaintiff can recover fifty percent of his
recoverable damages without invoking solidary liability, it appears solidary
liability does not apply. This view was referred to as the conditional or
functional liability interpretation. 28 Both the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of
Appeal 29 and a scholar 0 who has written extensively on Article 2324 followed
this view. However, the Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeal expressed a
contrary view. In Thompson v. Hodge' and Johnston v. Fontana,32 the second
circuit held solidary liability under Article 2324(B) was applicable before
determining whether the plaintiff could recover fifty percent of his recoverable
damages. This was the view later adopted by the Louisiana Supreme Court in
Touchard v. Williams.33 The supreme court held that the legislature, in
amending Article 2324(B), intended to place a cap on solidarity among joint
tortfeasors rather than create conditional solidarity among joint tortfeasors. 4
Thus, a plaintiff may require any solidarily liable tortfeasor to pay fifty percent
of plaintiffs recoverable damages as long as plaintiffs degree of fault, if any,
is less than the tortfeasor's degree of fault. If the tortfeasor's fault is greater
than fifty percent of plaintiff's recoverable damages, then that tortfeasor will be
liable for his virile share.
In the hypothetical above, Kramer would no longer be able to collect
sixty-two and one-half percent of the judgment from Jerrylift. Under the
supreme court's interpretation, Kramer would be limited to fifty percent of his
recoverable damages. Since Jerrylift is already liable for fifty percent of the
judgment, the most recoverable damages could be,36 the amendments to Article
2324(B) have limited Kramer's ability to collect his entire judgment. Amended
Article 2324(B) has no effect on the amount Kramer could collect from Elaine
since Kramer's fault is greater than Elaine's. Under amended Article 2324(B)
and the pre-amendment version, Kramer is only able to collect twelve and one-
half percent of the judgment from Elaine. Thus far, the amendments have had
some effect on solidary liability, particularly the amount a plaintiff can collect
from a solidarily liable tortfeasor less than fifty percent at fault.
27. La. Civ. Code art. 2324(B) (emphasis added).
28. Touchard v. Williams. 617 So. 2d 885, 887 (La. 1993).
29. Touchard v. Williams, 606 So. 2d 927 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1992), rev"d, 617 So. 2d 885
(1993).
30. Robertson, supra note 20, at 45-48.
31. 577 So. 2d 1172 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1991).
32. 610 So. 2d 1119 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1992), writ denied, 618 So. 2d 407 (1993).
33. 617 So, 2d 885 (La. 1993).
34. Id. at 893.
35. See supra part 11.
36. See infra part VI, discussing possible definitions of "recoverable damages."
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B. Exception for cases "as otherwise provided by law"
Under amended Article 2324(B), "[i]f liability is not ... as otherwise
provided by law, then liability for damages caused by two or more persons shall
be solidary."37 Thus, Article 2324(B) does not apply in cases "as otherwise
provided by law." Since this exception will allow a plaintiff to avoid the fifty
percent cap, and impose greater liability on defendants, the meaning of this
phrase is significant.
Most scholars and commentators are not sure exactly when "as otherwise
provided by law" applies. At least one scholar believes it will be up to the
courts to define, since there is no statutory definition.38 But, in the six years
since the amendment to Article 2324(B), neither the Louisiana Supreme Court
nor any Louisiana appellate court had directly addressed the issue. Only one
federal court in Louisiana has provided some indication of when a situation "as
otherwise provided by law" will arise.39 One scholar suggests some possible
"as otherwise provided by law" situations: an insurance company solidarily
liable with a third-party tortfeasor policy holder; a vicariously liable employer
solidarily liable with a third-party tortfeasor employee; or custom, which is
highly unlikely.'
it has also been suggested that the phrase might be used by the courts to
circumvent the fifty percent cap.4' However, even though the jurisprudence has
not interpreted the phrase, it is clear that courts have been applying the fifty-
percent cap. Another commentator presumed the phrase refers to other'
legislation and not jurisprudence. 42 However, interpretations, thus far, have not
shed much light on the meaning of "as otherwise provided by law," as used in
Article 2324(B).
In Rosskamp v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,43 the plaintiff tried to avoid the
application of Article 2324(B) claiming Article 1818 came within the meaning
of "as otherwise provided by law." If applied to cases to which Article 2324(B)
applies, Article 181844 would allow the plaintiff to demand the whole perfor-
mance from a solidarily liable tortfeasor and avoid the fifty percent cap by
applying the rules of solidary obligations under the law of Obligations.
However, Judge Duplantier rejected this interpretation:
37. La. Civ. Code art. 2324(B) (emphasis added).
38. Galligan, supra note 3, at 2.
39. Rosskamp v. Phillips Petroleum Co., No. 89-4892, 1991 WL 195473 (E.D. La. Sept. 23,
1991). See discussion infra note 43 and accompanying text.
40. Galligan, supra note 3, at 2.
41. Queenan, supra note 3, at 1376-82.
42. Bruce V. Schewe, Developments in the Law, Obligations, 48 La. L. Rev. 423, 425 (1987).
43. No. 89.4892, 1991 WL 195473 (E.D. La. Sept. 23, 1991).
44. "An indivisible obligation with more than one obligor is subject to the rules governing
solidary obligors." La. Civ. Code art. 1818.
1994] 1643
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While both Articles 2324 and 1818 are in Book III of the Civil
Code, Article 1818 is in Title III, Chapter 3 of Book III, that chapter
covers "Divisible and Indivisible Obligations." . . . Article 2324 [is] in
Title V, Chapter 2, covering "Offenses and Quasi Offenses." The
articles on offenses and quasi-offenses impose duties owed to the
general public. While the articles can be described as imposing an
"obligation," that "obligation" is distinguishable from the conventional
or legal obligations created in Title IlI-Obligations in General. Thus,
Article 1818 is inapplicable to torts."5
This interpretation makes it clear that applicability of Article 1818 is not a
situation "as otherwise provided by law" and suggests tort obligations will not
fall under the exception.
If two or more persons cause indivisible damage to another, Article 2324(B)
probably will apply. The exception for those cases "as otherwise provided by
law" will not affect these situations. Since this is the only solidary liability
statute in the Civil Code that places a cap on solidary liability, legislators were
probably concerned about the cap applying to non-tort solidary liability
situations. The legislature may have added the phrase to clarify that the fifty
percent cap applied only in tort cases and not in other solidary liability
situations.4
6
IV. QUANTIFICATION OF EMPLOYER FAULT UNDER AMENDED ARTICLE
2324(B)
A. Pre-Amendinent Decisions
Before Article 2324(B) was amended in 1987, the statute was interpreted as
not requiring the quantification of employer fault.4 7 Louisiana Revised Statutes
23:1032 provides that worker's compensation is the exclusive remedy for an
45. Rosskamnp, 1991 WL 195473. at *1.
46. Touchard v. Williams, 617 So. 2d 885, 891 (La. 1993).
47. Guidry v. Frank Guidry Oil Co., 579 So. 2d 947 (La. 1991), overruled by Gauthier v.
O'Bren, 618 So. 2d 825 (1993); Melton v. General Elec. Co., 579 So. 2d 448 (La. 1991), overruled
by Gauthier v. O'Brien, 618 So. 2d 825 (1993); Weber v. Caterpillar Mach. Corp., 542 So. 2d 544
(La. App. 1st Cir.), writs denied, 548 So. 2d 332, 334 (1989); Thibodeaux v. Union Tank Car Co.,
547 So. 2d 763 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1989), overruled by Williams v. Sewerage & Water Bd., 611 So.
2d 1383 (1993) (overruling only on issue of prescription); Thompson v. Petrounited Terminals, Inc.,
536 So. 2d 504 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1988), writs denied, 537 So. 2d 212, 213 (1989); Eskine v.
Regional Transit Auth. 531 So. 2d 1159 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1988); Senez v. Grumman Flxible Corp.
518 So. 2d 574 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1987), writ denied, 521 So. 2d 1151 (1988); Franklin v. Oilfield
Heavy Haulers 478 So. 2d 549 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1985), writs denied, 481 So. 2d 1330, 1331 (1986);
Cripe v. Haynes, 350 So. 2d 956 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1977), overruled by Williams v. Sewerage &
Water Bd., 611 So. 2d 1383 (1993) (overruling only on issue of prescription).
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employee for the negligent 8 acts of his employer and co-employees.4 9 Thus,
the employer is statutorily immune and would not compensate the plaintiff if its
fault were quantified. Consequently, it was logical not to quantify employer
fault. But this rule was not always followed.
At the trial level, employer fault had been quantified by juries, usually when
the employer intervened to recover worker's compensation payments." This
was not totally without reason since Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article
1812"' permits the quantification of the fault of all parties. The fault quantified
was handled in one of three ways. If the plaintiff was more at fault than the
third-party tortfeasor, the plaintiff was allocated all the employer fault. If the
third-party tortfeasor was more at fault than the plaintiff, the third-party
tortfeasor was allocated the employer fault. Finally, the supreme court appeared
to adopt a ratio approach that allocates the employer fault in proportion to the
fault of the other parties at fault, including the plaintiff.
The ratio approach was first applied in Guidry v. Frank Guidry Oil Co.,52
decided in 1991 after the amendments to Article 2324(B), which applied pre-
amendment Article 2324. Guidry reaffirmed the rule that employer fault should
not be quantified under pre-amendment Article 2324. The jury had already
quantified employer fault after the employer intervened to recover worker's
compensation payments, and the court had to decide what to do with the fault
quantified. Plaintiff was assessed ten percent of the fault, the third-party
tortfeasor seventy percent, and the employer twenty percent. 53  The court
adopted Professor Robertson's ratio approach' and reapportioned the em-
ployer's fault between the plaintiff and the third-party tortfeasor. Thus, the
plaintiff's fault was reassessed at twelve and one-half percent55 and the third-
party tortfeasor's at eighty-seven and one-half percent.' However, the court
was not unanimous in its treatment of employer fault in this situations.
48. Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1032(B) states: "Nothing in this Chapter shall affect the
liability of the employer ... to a fine or penalty under any other statute or the liability, civil or
criminal, resulting from an intentional act." La. R.S. 23:1032 (Supp. 1993).
49. Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1032(A)(!)(a) states: "The rights and remedies herein granted
to an employee ... for which he is entitled to compensation under this Chapter, shall be exclusive
of all other rights and remedies of such employee.., against his employer... for said injury.
La. R.S. 23:1032 (Supp. 1993).
50. See the cases cited supra note 19.
5 1. Article 1812(C) provides, in part: "In cases to recover damages for injury.. the court may
submit to the jury special written questions inquiring as to ... whether another person, whether a
party or not, other than the person suffering injury ... was at fault, and, if so ... [tlhe degree of
such fault, expressed in percentage." La. Code Civ. P. art. 1812.
52. 579 So. 2d 947 (La. 1991).
53. Id. at 954. The jury assessed forty-live percent of the fault to the plaintiff, thirty-five
percent to the third-party tortfeasor, and twenty percent to the employer. But, the Louisiana Supreme
Court reassessed the fault because the jury did not correctly evaluate comparative fault. Id. at 950-
952.
54. Id. at 954. See Robertson, supra note 20, at 54-55.
55. 10% + (1/8 X 20% [2.5%1) = 12.5%.
56. 70% + (7/8 X 20% [17.5%]) = 87.5%.
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Justice Lemmon wrote that employer fault should be quantified and dissented
in the opinion. Not quantifying employer fault, he said, could result in a
distortion of fault for the other tortfeasors." He also noted that it is simpler,
fairer, and more logical to require the jury to quantify one hundred percent of the
fault established by the evidence.58 Thus, Justice Lemmon felt that if the
employer is at fault, its fault must be quantified.
Justice Hall dissented in part. He stated the plaintiff should have been able
to recover ninety percent of the judgment rather than only eighty-seven and one-
half percent. Justice Hall relied on Article 2323, which states that a plaintiff is
entitled to the full amount of damages less his proportion of fault.5 9 Reappor-
tioning employer fault on a ratio basis reduced plaintiff's recovery by two and
one-half percent. According to Justice Hall, the result is contrary to the scheme
of the worker's compensation law and comparative fault. Thus, Justice Hall
believes the quantified employer fault should not affect the maximum amount the
plaintiff can recover.
B. Post-Amendinent Decisions
Even though Guidry was decided under the pre-amendment article, there was
a hint the case may have been decided differently under amended Article
2324(B). In a footnote, Justice Lemmon indicates the case might have been
decided differently under amended Article 2324(B) by making it clear that "[t]his
case arose before the 1987 amendment to the solidary liability provisions of La.
Civ. Code art. 2324."6 Also, in Melton v. General Electric Co.,6' decided the
same day as Guidry, the Louisiana Supreme Court said that "[t]o require
interrogatories of employer's fault without express legislative direction would be
an unjustified judicial innovation. 62  In addition, after refusing to quantify
employer fault under the pre-amendment statute, the fourth circuit noted, "We
do not disagree that this result seems unfair to appellant, but find this to be a
correct application of the law and any change therein to be the province not of
the courts but of the legislature. 6 3 Did amended Article 2324(B) provide the
legislative direction the court was asking for?
The first circuit hinted that amended Article 2324(B) requires quantification
of employer fault. In Thompson v. Petrounited Terminals, Inc.,64 the court
refused to reduce plaintiffs recovery by the fault of his employer. The court
recognized the "unfairness" of the result, but found itself without the authority
57. Guidry v. Frank Guidry Oil Co., 579 So. 2d 947, 955 (La. 1991) (Lemmon, J., dissenting).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 956 (Hall, J., dissenting in part).
60. Id. at 954 n.1 (Lemmon, J., dissenting).
61. 579 So. 2d 448 (La. 1991).
62. Id. at 452.
63. Morrison v. J.A. Jones Constr. Co., 537 So. 2d 360 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1988).
64. 536 So. 2d 504 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1989).
1646 [Vol. 54
COMMENTS
to fashion a different remedy without a clear legislative mandate." The first
circuit further stated:
We are however encouraged by the recent amendment to LSA-C.C.
art. 2324 which now provides in pertinent part that:
[T]he liability for damages caused by two or more persons shall
be a joint, divisible obligation, and a joint tortfeasor shall not be
sblidarily liable with any other person for damages attributable to
the fault of such other person, . . . regardless of such other
person's ... immunity by statute or otherwise."
This case was followed by numerous federal district court cases that quantified
employer fault under amended Article 2324(B).67
In Jarreau v. City of Baton Rouge,6 the first'circuit finally interpreted
amended Article 2324(B). The court held employer fault must be quantified
under amended Article 2324(B) "[i]n order to im'plement this provision." 69 In
contrast, the third circuit in Gauthier v. O'Brien70 held amended Article
2324(B) did not require the quantification of employer fault. This view was
consistent with interpretations of the pre-amendment statute. The third circuit is
the only court that found amended Article 2324(B) did not require the quantifica-
tion of employer fault.
C. The Gauthier Approach
The Louisiana Supreme Court settled the conflict between the circuits when
it reviewed Gauthier. The court departed from the longstanding jurisprudential
history of not quantifying employer fault under Article 2324 and decided the
amended statute required quantification. The majority found "employer fault
must be assessed in order to appropriately assess tortfeasors fault; however...
the employer ... will not be adversely effected by an assessment of fault."'"
Pre-amendment jurisprudence interpreting Article 2324(B) did not quantify
employer fault fearing quantification would penalize the party worker's
compensation was designed to benefit, the injured employee. However, the
65. Id. at 516.
66. Id. at 516-17 (citations omitted).
67. Fisher v. Reeled Tubing, Inc., No. 91-1375, 1993 WL 121240 (E.D. La: Apr. 14, 1993);
Fisher v. Jetstream of Houston, Inc., No. 91-2752, 1992 WL 185707 (E.D. La. July 29, 1992);
Higdon v. Hubbell Configurations, Inc., No. 90-4201, 1992 WL 161120 (E.D. La. June 25, 1992);
Durel v. American Pecco Corp., No. 90-863, 1992 WL 74589 (E.D. La. Mar. 30, 1992); Orkes v.
Chevron U.S.A., Inc., No. 91-0024, 1992 WL 40850 (E.D. La. Feb. 21, 1992); Rosskamp v. Phillips
Petroleum Co., No. 89-4892, 1991 WL 195473 (E.D. La. Sept. 23, 1991).
68. 602 So. 2d 1124 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1992).
69. Id. at 1127 n.5.
70. 606 So. 2d 915 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1992), rev'd, 618 So. 2d 825 (1993).
71. Gauthier v. O'Brien, 618 So. 2d 825, 826 (La. 1993) (emphasis added).
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majority in Gauthier recognized that the employee will recover compensation.72
The majority also noted that quantifying employer fault would serve to
implement Louisiana's comparative fault scheme. 3 The court further stated
that it was not "unfamiliar" to allocate fault to non-parties since phantom
tortfeasor fault has been assessed under Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article
1812.74 The court held that the assessment of employer fault is made "manda-
tory" by the 1987 amendments to Article 2324(B). 71
After the court decided that Article 2323(B) requires the quantification of
employer fault, it had to decide what to do with the fault quantified. Under the
pre-amendment statute, courts used three approaches when employer fault was
quantified. 6 But the pre-amendment statute did not require the quantification
of employer fault, as does amended Article 2324(B). Thus, the pre-amendment
decisions were trying to reassess the fault as the jury would have assessed it had
they not erred by quantifying employer fault. Despite this distinction, the
supreme court adopted one of the pre-amendment methods.
The ratio approach, first used in Guidry and recommended by Professor
Robertson, was adopted by the supreme court as the way of apportioning the
employer fault quantified.
While employer fault must be quantified by a jury to enable the jury to
reach a fairer determination of the relative fault of all blameworthy
parties, the judge, after the jury has returned a verdict, should disregard
the proportion of fault assessed to the employer and reallot the
proportionate fault to all other blameworthy parties.77
As a result, despite the quantification of employer fault required by amended
Article 2324(B), there does not appear to be any difference from the result in
Guidry which held pre-amendment Article 2324 did not require quantifying
employer fault. In the hypothetical above,7" the result would be the same under
Gauthier, since employer fault will be reapportioned in the same manner.
According to Justice Dennis' dissent, this approach will reduce plaintiff's
recoverable damages when the plaintiff is also at fault.79 This view is contrary
to that of the majority, which believes the "[a]llocation of employer fault and
adopting a relative fault formula will not adversely impact a plaintiff's recovery;
72. Id. at 829.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 831.
75. Id.
76. See supra notes 20 and 21 and accompanying text.
77. Gauthier v. O'Brien, 618 So. 2d 825, 833 (La. 1993) (emphasis added).
78. See supra part II.
79. Gauthier, 618 So. 2d at 834 (Dennis, J., dissenting). See also id. at 830, reflecting Professor




a plaintiff's recovery will be reduced only in proportion to the plaintiffs own
negligence."'W Justice Lemmon, concurring, explained the disagreement:
I disagree with my dissenting colleague that the ratio approach attributes
part of the employer's fault to reduce the plaintiff employee's recovery.
If the plaintiff employee is twenty percent at fault and the employer and
third party tortfeasor are each forty percent at fault, the plaintiff
employee's recovery will be reduced by one-third because of his
comparative fault and twenty percent in relation to the third party
tortfeasor's fault, the jury would have allocated two-thirds fault to the
third party tortfeasor and one-third fault to the plaintiff employee."
Based on Justice Lemmon's rationale, the result would be the same for the
plaintiff under the ratio approach since the jury would have allocated fault in this
manner had they not quantified employer fault. But the reason for allocating
employer fault is to "appropriately assess the fault of third party tortfeasors." 2
Does the ratio approach, as a method of dealing with employer fault after it has
been quantified, appropriately assess the fault of third-party tortfeasors?
D. How does Gauthier change quantification of fault?
The effect of Gauthier on the quantification of fault is best illustrated by two
situations. 3 If a jury, after Gauthier, allocates ninety-nine percent of the fault
to the employer and one percent to the third-party tortfeasor, the result does not
appear to be different than if the employer's fault was not quantified. Under
Gauthier, employer fault must be quantified, but is reallotted to the other
blameworthy parties. Since the only other blameworthy party is the tortfeasor,
the tortfeasor will bear all of the employer's ninety-nine percent fault.
Consequently, the tortfeasor is liable for one hundred percent of the judgment.
This is exactly what would have been assessed if employer fault was not
quantified because only one defendant would have been allocated fault. Also,
this illustrates the same situation feared under pre-amendment Article 2324,
which was considered unfair." How can this be the result if the purpose of
allocating employer fault is to appropriately assess the fault of third-party
tortfeasors? Is the third-party tortfeasor liable for forty percent of the judgment,
fifty percent of recoverable damages, or one hundred percent of the judgment?
The result of Gauthier suggests that the third-party tortfeasor is liable for one
hundred percent of the judgment since employer fault is "disregarded" and
80. id. at 832.
81. Id. at 833 (Lemmon, J., concurring).
82. Id. at 826.
83. Gauthier was decided on a preliminary motion, and fault of the parties had not been
quantified. Thus, the approach was not applied.
84. See supra part I.
1994] 1649
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
"reallotted." If that is the effect, this approach, applied to these facts, does not
appropriately assess the fault of third-party tortfeasors.
The situation is not much better when the plaintiff is also at fault. If the
jury assesses fifty percent of the fault to the employer, forty percent to a third-
party tortfeasor, and ten percent to the plaintiff, the reallocation not only affects
the third-party tortfeasor, but also the plaintiff. The plaintiff will bear one-fifth
of the employer fault, and the third-party tortfeasor four-fifths when employer
fault is reallotted to the other blameworthy parties. After reallocation, the
plaintiff's fault will be reassessed at twenty percent8s and the third-party
tortfeasor's at eighty percent.' Does the plaintiff have his recovery reduced by
ten or twenty percent? Is the third-party tortfeasor liable for forty percent of the
judgment, fifty percent of recoverable damages, or eighty percent of the
judgment? After Gauthier, plaintiffs recovery is apparently reduced by twenty
percent, and the third-party tortfeasor is liable for eighty percent of the
judgment.8 7 Again, this is not appropriately assessing the fault of third-party
tortfeasors. Thus, the real problem is not whether employer fault must be
quantified, but what to do with it once quantified.
E. What should be done with the quantified employer fault?
Solidary liability and worker's compensation are not mutually exclusive
when the employer is at fault. Employer fault was not quantified before 1987
because, with worker's compensation as the employee's exclusive remedy, the
employer could not be required to compensate the employee in a tort action for
negligence. 8 Why quantify employer fault if the plaintiff cannot recover
anything from the employer? As the cases have indicated, this was not fair to
the third-party tortfeasors who had to bear the employer fault that was not
quantified.' 9 Gauthier made it clear, the reason for quantifying employer fault
was to "appropriately assess the fault of third party tortfeasors." The majority
did not, however, successfully achieve this goal in its treatment of the employer
fault after quantification.
When an employee is injured by an employer or co-employee, the
plaintiff/employee is not without compensation for the employer's or co-
employee's fault. In fact, the majority recognizes in Gauthier that the
plaintiff/employee recovers from his employer under worker's compensation. 9°
The compensation may not be as much as a tort judgment, but the worker's
85. 10% + (115 X 50% [10%1) = 20%.
86. 40% + (4/5 X 50% [40%]) = 80%.
87. This is supported by the United States Fifth Circuit's interpretation of Gauthier in
Prestenbach v. Rains, 4 F.3d 358 (5th Cir. 1993).
88, See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
89. See the cases cited supra note 4.
90. Gauthier v. O'Brien, 618 So. 2d 825, 829 (La. 1993).
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compensation law has been described as a "fair exchange,"'" and is designed
as a "bargain" 92 between the employer and the employee. As between the
plaintiff/employee and the third-party tortfeasor, it is more equitable to require
plaintiffs to bear the employer fault because they are receiving some compensa-
tion for that fault through worker's compensation. The third-party tortfeasor
does not receive anything since he cannot seek contribution from the employ-
er.93 Thus, making the plaintiff bear the quantified employer'fault is not
unconscionable. But, there is a better reason than equity to make the plaintiff
bear his employer's fault.
Under pre-amendment Article 2324 it was widely held that a plaintiff's
judgment was reduced by the fault of a solidarily liable, settling tortfeasor.94
The amended statute does not appear to change this result. Settlement is a
compromise between the plaintiff and a defendant.93  As a result of the
compromise, each party gives up certain rights in order to receive the benefit of
preventing litigation, regardless of fault.
In Thompson v. Petrounited Terninals, Inc., the first circuit court of appeal
characterized Louisiana's worker's compensation "as a compromise between
employer and employee."96 The employee is assured of recovering compensa-
tion benefits from his employer if injured in the course and scope of employ-
ment. The employer is required to provide worker's compensation insurance to
assure this recovery, but is immune from suit outside the worker's compensation
scheme, regardless of fault. 97 Thus, each party must give up certain rights in
order to receive the benefit.98
The worker's compensation "bargain" and settlement are not the same, but
they produce similar consequences. In each compromise, a party gives up rights
in order to assure recovery for injuries, regardless of the other party's fault. In
the case of the settling plaintiff, if the settling tortfeasor is found at fault, then
91. Adams v. Time Saver Stores, Inc, 615 So. 2d 460, 463 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 617
So. 2d 910 (1993).
92. Gauthier, 618 So. 2d at 828. See also Donald C. Massey and A. Kirk Gasperecz,
Employers Beware: The Free Ride May Be Over, 33 Loy. L. Rev. 947, 948-950 (1988).
93. Gauthier, 618 So. 2d at 828.
94. Robertson, supra note 20, at 38-43, 50.
95. Article 3071 provides in part:
A transaction or compromise is an agreement between two or more persons, who, for
preventing or putting an end to a lawsuit, adjust their differences by mutual consent, in
the manner which they agree on, and which every one of them prefers to the hope of
gaining, balanced by the danger of losing.
La. Civ, Code art. 3071.
96. Thompson v. Petrounited Terminals, Inc.. 536 So. 2d 504, 516 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1989)
(emphasis added).
97. The employer may be liable in tort for an intentional act against the employee. See supra
note 48.
98. Gauthier v. O'Brien, 618 So. 2d 825, 828 (La. 1993).
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the plaintiff's recovery will be reduced by that fault.99 Consequently, the
employee's recovery should also be reduced by the employer's fault.
Further support for reducing plaintiff's recovery by employer fault is found
in the reasoning of the Gauthier decision. The majority analogized to other
jurisdictions with worker's compensation schemes similar to Louisiana's to
support quantifying employer fault. A Kansas case referred to in Gauthier to
support quantifying employer fault provides insight into what might be done with
the fault once quantified. In Scales v. St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Co.,,0'
the Kansas court reduced plaintiff's recovery by the quantified employer fault.
In that case, a third-party tortfeasor was found fifty percent at fault, and the
employer fifty percent at fault. The Kansas court found that the third-party
tortfeasor was not required to pay the entire judgment and reduced the plaintiff's
award by fifty percent, the employer's fault."0 ' The majority should have used
this opinion as a guide for determining what to do with the quantified employer
fault instead of stopping with the principle of quantifying employer fault. The
result in Gauthier would have been fairer if it had.
V. PHANTOM TORTFEASORS
As with employer fault, the quantification of the fault of phantom tort-
feasors0 2 can be questioned under amended Article 2324(B). Amended Article
2324(B) provides that "a joint tortfeasor shall not be solidarily liable with any
other person for damages attributable to the fault of such other persons ...
regardless of such other person's insolvency, ability to pay, degree of fault, or
immunity by statute or otherwise."'0 3 The quantification of phantom tortfeasor
fault has not been as much of a problem for the courts as the quantification of
employer fault. The second circuit has addressed the quantification of phantom
tortfeasor fault under amended Article 2324(B).
In Devereaux v. Allstate Insurance Co.,"° the second circuit held that
phantom tortfeasor fault must be quantified under amended Article 2324(B).
This was not a surprise since phantom tortfeasor fault was quantified under pre-
amendment Article 2324.105 Also, Gauthier's policy of appropriately assessing
the fault of third-party tortfeasors provides the rationale for quantifying phantom
tortfeasor fault. If employer fault must be quantified to appropriately assess the
fault of third-party tortfeasors, then it follows that phantom tortfeasor fault also
99. Diggs v. Hood, 772 F.2d 190 (5th Cir. 1985).
100. 582 P.2d 300 (Kan. 1978).
101. Id. at 309.
102. See supra note 25.
103. La. Civ. Code art. 2324(B).
104. 557 So. 2d 1091 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1990).
105. Perez v. State, 578 So. 2d 1199 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 581 So. 2d 706 (1991);
Vernado v. Continental Ins. Co., 446 So. 2d 1343 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1984). See also Robertson,
supra note 20, at 57.
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must be quantified. Thus, the Louisiana Supreme Court should recognize
quantification of phantom tortfeasor fault. However, there is still the problem
of what to do with the fault quantified. The court in Devereaux did not address
this issue, but Gauthier provides some guidance.
Gauthier can be extended to phantom tortfeasor fault, and the argument for
using the ratio approach is stronger. No party benefits when there is phantom
tortfeasor fault as compared to the plaintiff/employee receiving some compensa-
tion under worker's compensation when the employer is at fault. Thus, applying
the ratio approach and spreading the phantom tortfeasor fault among the other
blameworthy parties is a fair solution. It is likely that the Louisiana Supreme
Court will extend the application of the ratio approach to phantom tortfeasor
fault.
VI. WHAT ARE "RECOVERABLE DAMAGES"?
Even if all the above issues are resolved and a third-party tortfeasor's fault
is determined, another problem still remains: what are "recoverable damages"?
Under amended Article 2324(B), "liability ... shall be solidary only to the
extent necessary for the person suffering injury ... to recover fifty percent of
his recoverable damages."' 6 This language differs from part A, which holds
intentional tortfeasors liable "for the damage caused."' °7 "Damage" probably
refers to the entire judgment. But, what are "recoverable damages"? Some
scholars believe that recoverable damages refers simply to the total judg-
ment. 08 However, the Civil Code does not support this notion, and jurispru-
dence has not expressly defined the phrase.
Failing to define recoverable damages creates many problems since it is the
basis for calculating the fifty-percent cap. Plaintiffs, in efforts to maximize their
collection of the entire judgment, will argue that recoverable damages means the
entire judgment. Defendants, to minimize plaintiff's collection of the judgment,
will argue that recoverable damages means something less than the entire
judgment. There are several possible definitions of recoverable damages: the
entire judgment less plaintiffs fault; the entire judgment less employer fault,
which is quantified under Gauthier; the entire judgment less phantom tortfeasor
fault, which is quantified under Devereaux; the entire judgment less plaintiff's
fault and employer fault or phantom tortfeasor fault; the total judgment less
settling tortfeasors' fault; or any combination of the above. Considering the
numerous possible definitions of recoverable damages, much confusion results
from the lack of a definition. However, courts that have applied the cap have
not grappled with the possible definitions, but have adopted a definition for
recoverable damages without discussion.
106. La. Civ. Code art. 2324(B).
107. La. Civ. Code art. 2324(A).
108. Robertson, supra note 20. at 45-46; Queenan, supra note 3, at 1373-76, 1383-84.
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The definition of recoverable damages as the total judgment less employer
fault is possible after Gauthier, which requires quantification of employer fault.
Under a literal definition of recoverable damages, employer fault would not be
included since a plaintiff cannot recover this amount from a statutorily immune
employer. Gauthier supports the view that employer fault will not be subtracted
from the total judgment to arrive at recoverable damages. Gauthier requires the
reallocation of employer fault to the other blameworthy parties, which may
include the plaintiff. It would not be fair to deduct again that amount from
plaintiff's recoverable damages."° Also, for all practical purposes, the amount
of employer fault calculated under Gauthier is disregarded except as a basis for
reapportioning it to other blameworthy parties.
Phantom tortfeasor fault may also reduce plaintiff's recoverable damages
since it is quantified under Devereaux, and that quantification is supported by
Gauthier. But, again, since this fault will likely be reallotted to the other
blameworthy parties, it would not be fair to deduct it from a plaintiff's
recoverable damages. If a plaintiff is at fault, Gauthier's rationale supports
requiring the plaintiff to proportionately share part of the phantom tortfeasor
fault. Thus, the best definition of recoverable damages may require a reduction
of the total judgment by the plaintiff's fault after reallocation.
Reducing recoverable damages by plaintiffs fault is supported by the Civil
Code and the jurisprudence." 0 Article 2323 requires a reduction of plaintiffs
recovery by the degree of his fault."' Before amended Article 2324(B), a
plaintiff could hold a solidarily liable tortfeasor liable only for the total judgment
less plaintiffs fault. Thus, under pre-amendment Article 2324 recovery was
109. If a plaintiff is twenty-five percent at fault, an employer fifty percent, and a third-party
tortfeasor twenty-five percent, the employer fault of fifty percent, would be reallocated so that the
third-party tortfeasor's fault would be reassessed at fifty percent and the plaintiff's at fifty percent.
Plaintiff's recovery is already redtced by fifty percent, his fault, under comparative fault. See supra
note 15 and accompanying text. Thus, if recoverable damages are reduced by the employer's fault,
assessed at fifty percent, the plaintiff will not be entitled to recover anything even though the
tortfeasor is twenty-five percent at fault.
110. Reducing recoverable damages by plaintiff's fault may also be supported by Justice Dennis'
dissent in Gauthier v. O'Brien:
In the majority's opinion, the present case raises the broad question of whether a plaintiff,
under any circumstance, may have her recoverable damages from a tortfeasor reduced
because of the job-related fault of her employer. The majority's answer to the question
is, yes, when the plaintiff's fault contributes to her own injury, her recovery must be
reduced not only in proportion to her percentage of total fault between her and the
tortfeasor, bat also by a share of the employer's fault based on the ratio between her fault
and the tortfeasor's fault.
Gauthier v. O'Brien, 618 So. 2d 825, 834 (La. 1993) (Dennis, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). If
Justice Dennis is using recoverable damages in the same context as Article 2324(B) then, in his
opinion, the majority held that an at-fault plaintiff may have her recoverable damages reduced when
her employer is also at fault. However, Justice Dennis also refers to plaintiff's "recovery" later in
the discussion. Thus, it is unclear what he is referring to by use of the term "recoverable damages"
even though the term is unique to Article 2324(B).
I 11. See supra note 15.
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reduced by the degree of plaintiff's fault. This also reduced the amount for
which a plaintiff could hold a solidarily liable tortfeasor liable. If a fifty-percent
cap applies to the liability of solidarily liable tortfeasor's, then it follows that
when a plaintiff is at fault, his fault must be considered.
Despite this analogy to prior jurisprudence interpreting pre-amendment
Article 2324, there are no post-amendment cases which support reducing
recoverable damages by plaintiff's fault. In fact, without expressly so stating,
the jurisprudence appears to follow the view that recoverable damages means the
whole judgment, even when plaintiff is at fault." 2 Some courts disregard the
language of Article 2324(B) and refer to recoverable losses instead of recover-
able damages." t3  Even though it appears unlikely for a court to reduce
recoverable damages by plaintiff's fault, no court has ever expressly said that
recoverable damages could not be so reduced.
Perhaps a better approach is defining recoverable damages as the total
judgment less any settling tortfeasor's fault. The result of a compromise between
the plaintiff and the settling tortfeasor is that the plaintiff receives a benefit from
the settling tortfeasor and also gives up something for that benefit." 4 Non-
settling tortfeasors are not able to seek contribution because they will not have
to pay any part of the settling tortfeasor's portion of the judgment."' Judg-
ment will be reduced as a result of the settlement. Therefore, recoverable
damages should also be reduced. As with plaintiff's fault, Article 2324(B) does
not limit a third-party tortfeasor's liability by the proportionate fault of settling
tortfeasors. If a settling tortfeasor is found fifty-one percent at fault, each of the
other third-party tortfeasors could be required to pay fifty percent of recoverable
damages. If recoverable damages means the whole judgment, each third-party
tortfeasor could be required to pay fifty percent of the judgment. However, the
plaintiff can only recover forty-nine percent of the judgment. Thus, recoverable
damages will have to be something less than the whole judgment when the
settling tortfeasor is more than fifty percent at fault. In fairness to other
tortfeasors and to prevent confusion, recoverable damages should be reduced by
settling tortfeasor fault. However, the only case since Gauthier involving a
settling tortfeasor does not address the issue." 6
112. Touchard v. Williams. 617 So. 2d 885 (La. 1993). Jarreau v. City of Baton Rouge. 602 So.
2d 1124 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1992): Thompson v. Hodge. 577 So. 2d 1172 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1991);
Devereaux v. Allstate Ins. Co.. 557 So. 2d 1091 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1990).
113. Devereaux. 557 So. 2d at 1093. 1096. 1100: Thompson. 577 So. 2d at 1178.
114. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
115. Diggs v. Hood. 772 F.2d 190. 195-97 (5th Cir. 1985); Dill v. State Dep't ofTransp. & Dev..
545 So. 2d 994,997 (La. 1989); Watson v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Ins. Co.. 469 So. 2d 967, 971
n.9 (La. 1985); Casson v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 548 So. 2d 66. 70 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1989). See
also Robertson. stpra note 20. at 39.
116. David v. Cajun Painting Inc., 631 So. 2d 1176 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1994), held a settling
tonfeasor is a blameworthy party to whom a proportion of the employer fault must be allocated. The




The 1987 amendments to Article 2324(B) caused many problems, some
resolved, some not, in solidary liability in Louisiana tort law. Despite these
problems, amended Article 2324(B) is a workable statute, and jurisprudence has
provided some guidance in the statute's application.
We know Article 2324(B) places a cap on the liability of a solidarily liable
tortfeasor. A solidarily liable tortfeasor is liable for only fifty percent of the
injured party's recoverable damages. The injured party may seek fifty percent
of his recoverable damages from any solidarily liable tortfeasor even if the
injured party could otherwise recover fifty percent of his recoverable damages.
However, if the injured party is also at fault and the solidarily liable tortfeasor's
fault is less than the injured party's fault, then the solidarily liable tortfeasor is
liable for only his virile share and no more. Also, if a solidarily liable tortfeasor
is liable for more than fifty percent of the injured party's recoverable damages,
then he will be bound to compensate the injured party for his virile share despite
the cap.
In many situations, the failure to define recoverable damages will not cause
problems. If plaintiff is not at fault, recoverable damages will probably be the
whole judgment. However, if plaintiff is at fault and there is also employer fault
or phantom tortfeasor fault, then recoverable damages may be reduced by a
proportion of plaintiffs fault, which may include a proportion of the employer
fault or phantom tortfeasor fault. The only case involving a settling tortfeasor
after Gauthier did not address the issue of "recoverable damages." But, if
recoverable damages can be reduced by plaintiff's fault when there is also
employer fault or phantom fault, then recoverable damages should also be
reduced by settling tortfeasor fault. Consequently, the determination of
recoverable damages could change. depending on the situation of the case.
If there is employer fault or phantom tortfeasor fault, it will be quantified
under amended Article 2324(B). The problem remains of what should be done
with the faultquantified. The Louisiana Supreme Court has held this fault
should be "reallotted to the other blameworthy parties." In theory. this seems
fair, but when the enployer is at fault, plaintiffs will receive a windfall since
they will recover not only worker's compensation benefits, but also a proportion
of employer fault. Thus. plaintiff should absorb the quantified employer fault.
This is consistent with the principle of "appropriately assessing the fault of third-
party tortfeasors." However, when a phantom tortfeasor is at fault, the ratio
approach is a better way to apportion the uncompensated fault. Plaintiffs receive
no collateral compensation attributable to the fault of a phantom tortfeasor as
they do with the fault of an employer, and should not have to absorb this fault.
The exception to Article 2324(B) for cases "as otherwise provided by law"
has had the least amount of jurisprudential interpretation of all the issues covered
in this comment. This lack of interpretation. coupled with the frequent
application of Article 2324(B) to tort situations, suggests that the exception will
not provide a way for injured plaintiffs to avoid the fifty-percent cap on the
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amount recoverable from solidarily liable tortfeasors. More than likely, this
exception instead will prevent only solidarily liable parties, who are solidarily
liable under theories other than tort, from benefiting from the cap.
Many problems caused by Article 2324(B) have been resolved by juris-
prudential interpretations of the statute, and others will be resolved as the article
is applied to more situations. Amending the statute and starting over, as some
might suggest, may cause other problems for the courts to resolve. Thus, it is
best to leave the statute in its current form and allow jurisprudence to resolve the
remaining problems.
Chris J. LeBlanc

